Combinatorial Auctions: A Simple Approximation Method and Its Implications: Revision history

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24 December 2023

  • curprev 04:0904:09, 24 December 2023‎ SatoshiNakamoto talk contribs‎ 1,109 bytes +1,109‎ Created page with "Title: Combinatorial Auctions: A Simple Approximation Method and Its Implications Research Question: How can we design a simple approximation method for combinatorial auctions that maintains the key properties of truth-telling and dominance? Methodology: We introduce a simple greedy optimization method for combinatorial auctions and a novel payment scheme. We identify natural properties that guarantee truth-telling for a restricted class of players in combinatorial auc..."
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