Various Strategy Elimination Procedures

Title: Various Strategy Elimination Procedures

Research Question: How can we provide uniform and elementary proofs of order independence for various strategy elimination procedures in finite strategic games?

Methodology: The study uses abstract reduction systems, particularly Newman's Lemma, and its natural refinements. It focuses on the structural properties of dominance relations for both pure and mixed strategies.

Results: The research provides uniform and elementary proofs of order independence for various strategy elimination procedures. These include dominance by pure and mixed strategies, as well as inherent dominance and mixed dominance relations.

Implications: The findings have significant implications for the field of game theory. The uniform and elementary proofs offer a more accessible and straightforward approach to understanding the order independence of various strategy elimination procedures. This can lead to further research and applications in strategic games, decision theory, and other related fields.

Link to Article: https://arxiv.org/abs/0403024v1 Authors: arXiv ID: 0403024v1