Vickrey Auctions for Spectrum Allocation in Developing Countries

Title: Vickrey Auctions for Spectrum Allocation in Developing Countries

Research Question: Can Vickrey auctions be effectively used for allocating spectrum in developing countries?

Methodology: The study examined the applicability of Vickrey second-price auctions for allocating spectrum in developing countries. It was based on an analysis of auction models for resource allocation and an examination of the experience of auctioning spectrum in various countries. The study proposed a critical evaluation of using Vickrey second-price auctions to allocate spectrum in developing countries and suggested a new auction mechanism, the Vickrey "share auction," which would satisfy many axioms related to spectrum allocation in these countries.

Results: The study found that Vickrey auctions could potentially be effective in allocating spectrum in developing countries, subject to certain conditions. The analysis suggested that the Vickrey "share auction" could be a suitable mechanism for these countries, as it would satisfy many of the axioms identified in the study.

Implications: The findings of the study have important implications for the design and implementation of spectrum allocation mechanisms in developing countries. The Vickrey "share auction" mechanism could potentially lead to more efficient and cost-effective use of spectrum in these countries, thereby promoting economic development and competition. The study also contributes to the broader literature on auction design and application, particularly in the context of developing countries.

Link to Article: https://arxiv.org/abs/0109065v1 Authors: arXiv ID: 0109065v1