Game-Theoretic Framework for Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Systems

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Title: Game-Theoretic Framework for Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Systems

Research Question: How can we design an incentive system for peer-to-peer (P2P) systems that encourages users to contribute resources and maintain a high level of service quality?

Methodology: The researchers used game theory, a branch of mathematics that studies strategic interactions among rational players, to model the behavior of users in P2P systems. They proposed a differential service-based incentive scheme, where users who contribute more receive better quality of service.

Results: The researchers found that the proposed incentive scheme can improve the system's performance and maintain a high level of service quality. They also identified a Nash Equilibrium, a situation where no user can improve their utility by changing their strategy, indicating that the proposed scheme is stable.

Implications: The research suggests that game theory can be used to design effective incentive systems for P2P systems. The differential service-based incentive scheme can encourage users to contribute resources and maintain a high level of service quality. This has implications for the design of future P2P systems and the development of incentive mechanisms for other collaborative systems.

Link to Article: https://arxiv.org/abs/0310039v1 Authors: arXiv ID: 0310039v1